THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

ROUND TABLE

THE BALKANS

A Radio Discussion by PETER DRUCKER
LOUIS GOTTSCHALK *and* ROBERT ST. JOHN

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Around the Round Table . . . .

PETER DRUCKER, professor of political economy at Bennington College, was born in Vienna, Austria, in 1909. He came to this country in 1937 as a correspondent for a group of British newspapers. Professor Drucker received his Doctor of Law degree at the University of Frankfort. For a time he served as foreign and financial editor of the *Frankfurter Anzeiger*, and he was economist for a prominent British banking house before coming to the United States. He is the co-author of *Germany: The Last Four Years* (1937) and the author of *The End of Economic Man* (1939) and *The Future of Industrial Men* (1943) and a regular contributor to magazines and professional journals.

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK, professor of modern history at the University of Chicago, is especially interested in the field of French history and is an interpreter of French-American relations. He is the author of *Jean Paul Marat: A Study in Radicalism* (1927), which has also appeared in French translation; *The Era of the French Revolution* (1929); *Lafayette Comes to America* (1935); *Lafayette Joins the American Army* (1937); *Lady-in-Waiting: The Romance of Lafayette and Aglaé de Hunolstein* (1939); and *Lafayette and the Close of the American Revolution* (1942). Dr. Gottschalk received his A.B., M.A., and Ph. D. degrees from Cornell University and later was associated with the department of history there. He has taught at the University of Illinois and the University of Louisville and since 1925 has been associated with the University of Chicago.

ROBERT ST. JOHN, foreign correspondent and commentator for the National Broadcasting Company, is a native of Chicago and studied at Trinity College (Connecticut). He went abroad in 1939 and for two years covered, for the Associated Press, the Polish campaign, the entrance of the German troops into the Balkans, the two Rumanian revolutions, the ten-day Yugoslav campaign, the evacuation of Greece, and the beginning of the Crete battle. The year 1942 he spent in England as an N.B.C. correspondent, and for the past year Mr. St. John has been in Washington as an N.B.C. commentator. He is the author of *From the Land of Silent People* (1942) and numerous magazine articles on the Balkans and England.

THE BALKANS

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MR. GOTTSCHALK: The problem of the Balkans seems to me to crystallize around a few rather clear-cut issues. The issues themselves are complicated, but they stand out. I would like to throw into the hopper first of all the idea that the Balkans are a possible invasion route.

St. John, you have been through the Yugoslav campaign and the Greek campaign, and you have been in an open boat through the Adriatic Sea. We will, therefore, have to lean rather heavily upon you for geographical and military information.

MR. ST. JOHN: Yes, I saw some of those Balkan people fleeing into the hills in order to fight guerrilla warfare, and I know what allies we have inside those countries. But there is the big political problem between Russia and the Western Powers. That seems to me to be *the* big problem that must be settled quickly.

MR. DRUCKER: I agree with you, and I also agree that the Balkans are the rather flimsy back door to Hitler's fortress of Europe—the back door that could be forced quite easily, perhaps. In addition, I think that the political and social organization of the Balkan countries is perhaps the most urgent and certainly the most difficult problem of reconstruction. It has been that for a hundred years.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Then we have three issues—one advanced by each of us. There is, first of all, the problem of the Balkans as the back door to Europe; secondly, the problem of the Balkans as a political bone of contention in the international dispute between Russia and the Western Powers; and, thirdly, the point that the Balkans have a very intricate internal and domestic problem.

MR. ST. JOHN: Before we go into that first one, let us define the Balkans. I think for our purposes that we can say that the Balkans consist of the countries of Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and Turkey.

MR. DRUCKER: What these countries have in common is that they are all in southeastern Europe; that they are all peasant countries; and that through them lie the main routes to Central Europe, to Hitler's arsenal, and to Hitler's workshops.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I would like to raise that question of whether the Balkans are a good invasion route. St. John, tell us something about the geography of those areas from the military point of view.

MR. ST. JOHN: The important thing, it seems to me, is that in the Balkans we have organized armies fighting today, a situation which we do not have in other parts of Europe.

We all know that in Yugoslavia there are the Chetniks and the Partisans. Just to recapitulate, the Chetniks are led by General Mikhailovitch and are fighting principally in Serbia, in the southern part of Yugoslavia. Then, there are the Partisans, who are in the northern part and along the Dalmatian Coast. They are led by this man called "Tito."[1]

Down in Greece there are two other guerrilla armies—one sort of a left wing one; one more right wing. We must also remember that in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria there are armies in the field now in each one which some day will be fighting on our side.

MR. DRUCKER: There is, then, the first factor that in France or in Norway we would have only the sympathy and the support of the population, but we would have to do the work ourselves. In the Balkans, on the other hand, the German occupation is already challenged and very effectively challenged by citizen armies in the field who would be ready to cut off the German armies and would be

[1] General Draja Mikhailovitch is the leader of the Chetniks, and the Partisan leader is "Tito," or General Josip Brozovich, a former Croatian metal-worker. The German government has offered 100,000 gold marks for either man's head.

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ready to wreck the German communication system. In fact, they already have cut the German armies into parts. The Balkans, in other words, are already a battlefield.

MR. ST. JOHN: Armies exist in the Balkans which have weapons in their hands at the present moment. That is the important thing.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It is clear, then, that we would have allies. We already have fairly effective allies in the Balkans. I would like to raise the question of how effective the German occupation is in the Balkans. After all, the Balkans are occupied by the Germans, but I wonder whether they are more effectively occupied than Norway or France, or whether it is vice versa?

MR. DRUCKER: There are two differences. There is first the fact that the Germans in the Balkans do not really hold more than the key cities—they do not hold the countryside—whereas the occupation of France is an effective one. Secondly, the German armies in France can be supplied very easily, but the German armies in the Balkans suffer already from very great supply problems. There are almost no railways, and those railways are very largely cut by the guerrilla forces. So that, once an Allied army would be established in the Balkans, we would—and it is the only place on the European continent where that is true—have supply advantage on our side, and the Germans would have a terrific supply disadvantage.

MR. ST. JOHN: The railroads coming down from Germany into the Balkans have to cross three chains of mountains. That means three very narrow, dangerous mountain passes. In this section I actually know mountain passes where just one good stick of dynamite would wreck the railroad and the whole German transport problem for a long time.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: We also have the people there who are likely to put the dynamite under those railroads.

MR. DRUCKER: Just to show that we are not talking armchair strategy, I think that we ought not to forget that Mr. Churchill has

BALKAN RAILROADS

been an advocate of the Balkan route of invasion since 1914 and that the Russians have always held, as official theory, that it was the failure of the English attempt in 1915 to force the Balkan route that prolonged the last war for three more years and that led to the collapse of Russia. Moscow and London, therefore, have traditionally considered the Balkan route the logical invasion route.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That emphasizes the point, then, that both of you gentlemen seem to agree upon: that the Balkans would make not

only a good invasion point but probably at the present moment, in view of the present strategic situation, the best invasion point of Europe.

Now I would like to raise our second question—the one that St. John referred to—the fact that the Balkans are an international problem and that Russia does not see eye to eye with the Western Powers on the international status of the Balkans.

MR. ST. JOHN: That ties right in with the first point and explains why we have not gone into the Balkans already. I think that it is because of this political problem.

For example, I have information that the Anglo-American diplomats have actually approached Turkey with a scheme for the Turkish Army, when the Red Army starts approaching the Balkans, to go north and occupy the Balkans in order to form a wedge and a barrier which would keep Russia out of the Balkans and western Europe.

MR. DRUCKER: My information checks with yours except that, as far as I know, the Nazi diplomats, too, have given their blessings to those Turkish schemes of occupying the Balkans as a protection against the Russian flood.

It is not only true that we do not want Russia to be in the Balkans, but it is just as true that the Russians do not want us in the Balkans. It is a situation in which the great powers play "dog in the manger," with neither side wanting the other to be in the Balkans.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I am just a mere historian. I have no secret channels of information, but the idea that you both represent—that there is an effort to create a wedge on the part of the Western Powers against Russia's advance into the Balkans—sounds to me a little fantastic and, if true, unfortunate. It brings us right back into the nineteenth century, when every ten years there was a conference over the Near Eastern question and an effort to try to solve this Balkan issue.

MR. DRUCKER: I think that what you ought to say is simply

that we never grew out of the nineteenth century as far as the Balkans are concerned; that we still are living, working, and acting in a state where there is no agreement among the great powers and where, therefore, each side tries to keep out the other.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: In a sense, even 1918 was a nineteenth-century solution of the Balkan question.

MR. ST. JOHN: Very much so.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: But I would like to raise the question of what the major issue is between Russia and the Western Powers over the Balkans. Why do they have to have this dispute every ten years?

MR. ST. JOHN: Certainly it is very easy to prove that Russia does not want the Balkans and does not want to incorporate the Balkans into her Union of Soviet Republics.

MR. DRUCKER: She wants that as little as we want to incorporate the Balkans into the United States. Right?

MR. ST. JOHN: Yes. Of course, that brings us to the problem that if neither of us wants the Balkans, what on the earth are we fighting over them for?

MR. DRUCKER: The answer is not so very simple, but the answer is that the Balkans are the common border between the East and the West and that neither the East nor the West wants them, but neither of the two sides wants the other one to have the Balkans either.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That is to say that what neither side wants is a strong power there which is dominated by the other side.

MR. DRUCKER: Let us be concrete. From the Russian point of view, it is a cliché and a proverb of Russian policy that a strong power in the Balkans is a danger to Russia that must not be tolerated. Therefore, the Russians do not want England in the Balkans. They do not want the United States in the Balkans, and they have

vetoed, repeatedly, a Balkan federation. It is just as much a cliché of Western policy that we do not want Russia on the Mediterranean.

MR. ST. JOHN: What we are saying in effect is that there is really no uncompromising issue—that is, ideological issue, or even issue of territory between the Western Powers and Russia.

MR. DRUCKER: That is right.

MR. ST. JOHN: If we could just once get over our suspicion of each other and the desire not to have the other strong, the situation would be solved.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Let me interject a question. I have been reading a lot of literature, including Pribichevich's articles in *Fortune* on this Yugoslav question, and the impression that one gets from that literature is to the effect that there are very deep ideological issues involved in the Balkans. Would you gentlemen be inclined to deny that?[2]

MR. DRUCKER: That is certainly true, and I think that we ought to add that it is not these issues which divide the great powers and that none of the great powers has any definite stand on these issues. We are using them—both the Russians and we ourselves—for rather petty purposes and for unnecessary purposes. We could easily agree on a policy if we would agree on a joint European strategy of policy.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Before we go into a discussion of that ideological issue, which, it seems to me, belongs properly under the point raised about Balkan internal questions, I would like to raise the question of the Dardanelles. That is a traditional ground of dispute between England and Russia.

MR. DRUCKER: Let us place the Dardanelles—the Dardanelles are that strait, that maritime highway, on which Constantinople is

[2] See Stoyan Pribichevich's articles in *Fortune* magazine cited in the bibliography on page 22.

DEFENSES IN TURKEY

situated and through which lies the access to Russia's southern provinces. From the Russian point of view, any strong power on the Dardanelles controls southern Russia. From the British point of view, traditionally, Russia on the Dardanelles would control the

Mediterranean. Therefore, actually both of us have the interest of keeping any strong power out of the Dardanelles. As long as we cannot agree on that, we will always come to a head-on collision simply because we do not trust the other.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You gentlemen seem agreed that the major issue in international politics between Russia and the Western Powers is that it is a question of each wanting to avoid domination by the other in that area.

MR. DRUCKER: You can see that in an example. For instance, the Russians are profoundly indifferent, or can afford to be indifferent, to what we do with France. It is very far from Russia. We, on the other hand, can be rather indifferent as to what happens in Finland. Our interests are not at stake. But in the Balkans, both the Russian interests and our interests—especially of England—are at stake. Actually, there is no real conflict.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I want to get back to that ideological point which raises the third question. Apparently, the ideology is connected with the internal issues in the Balkans.

MR. ST. JOHN: Let us define things here again as we did in the first place. Let us define the Balkans—what kind of countries they are. There are about ninety million people in the Balkans, and about 90 per cent of them are peasants. In that respect, it is unlike the rest of Europe.

MR. DRUCKER: I am glad that you said that. That is really the characteristic of the Balkans. They are peasants, and there are no peasants any other place in Europe. That means that they are small landowners, very suspicious of industry, very suspicious of city life, very proud of their independence, and very possessive of the little land. There are no rich people in the Balkans. There are plenty of poor people.

MR. ST. JOHN: That means that there is a certain unity between the peoples of those various countries.

THE BALKANS AND ITS PEOPLES



The figures are the latest available data prior to the beginning of World War II. The United States has 3,022,000 square miles; 131,669,000 people; and 44 people per square mile. Source: *The Economic Almanac for 1942–43* (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1942).

MR. DRUCKER: And great social equality.

MR. ST. JOHN: Right.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Sometimes it is referred to as the "green" internationale.

MR. DRUCKER: I think that we also ought to say that it is a purely agricultural area in which there are very few industries and in which there are no industry raw materials. It is a very poor rural area.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The issues have sometimes been simplified in the press. You get the notion that, for example, if we would only throw out Hitler, we could solve the Balkan problem.

MR. DRUCKER: The answer, of course, is that there was a Balkan problem before Hitler. As a matter of fact, Hitler did very little but play upon the already existing problems. I think that you, St. John, know some of those problems from very close-hand experience.

MR. ST. JOHN: Last year, over in London, I saw the Yugoslav Royal Government-in-Exile at pretty close hand. Believe it or not, even in exile those Yugoslavs could hardly agree on anything. There were actually seven parties represented in that government-in-exile, and I remember their arguing and fighting over such things as who was going to be minister of agriculture two or three years from now.

MR. DRUCKER: That is not only in exile. Actually, on the spot where armies are fighting against the common German oppressor, they sometimes fight each other more than they fight the Germans. That is true in Yugoslavia; it is true in Greece; it is true in Poland.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That seems to me to illustrate a point that is very important. It comes right back to the nineteenth century again. Obviously, if there are only about two hundred Yugoslavs in London, or now in Cairo, and if they are divided into seven parties, that means that somebody else is providing the strength. They are being used as tools for somebody, aren't they?

POLITICAL DIVISIONS of the BALKANS
before World War II

MR. ST. JOHN: Yes, of course they are.

MR. DRUCKER: Let us get rid of another popular panacea. Maybe we can lay the ghost of the "proper boundaries." You will

remember that a good many people believe that if we could only draw the proper boundary lines in the Balkans, we would have peace and quiet. That was a 1918 illusion, and I think that it is necessary to say that there is no boundary line any place in the Balkans that could be drawn so as to solve the Balkan problems.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I would be inclined to agree with that. I think that it would be very difficult to draw boundary lines in the Balkans that would solve any problems and which would not create as many as they solved. At the same time, however, I wonder whether what you mean is that there is no national group or national feeling inside the Balkans.

MR. DRUCKER: I would say that there is plenty of national feeling but that there are no real nations. I would say that nationalism in the Balkans is something which is used only to hit the other fellow but not to organize its own house.

MR. ST. JOHN: That is a good point, but let us go on to list another ghost that ought to be gotten rid of. That is the idea that land reforms are the solution. There are not actually any big estates in the Balkans.

MR. DRUCKER: Except in Hungary.

MR. ST. JOHN: Except in Hungary, but in the rest of the Balkans, no. The peasants usually each own two, three, five, or ten acres of land, and that is about all.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: You mean that there are no two-thousand-acre estates in the Balkans?

MR. ST. JOHN: No.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Other than Hungary?

MR. ST. JOHN: That is right. The Balkans are principally an agricultural country with very few exports except Rumanian oil,[3]

[3] According to the United States Bureau of Mines, Rumanian oil production in 1940 (the last year for which there are authentic figures) was 43.2 million

which really is not so very important. They are self-sufficient only in food, and, therefore, they have to export their food.

MR. DRUCKER: That means that a federation of the Balkan countries, while it would solve a good many problems, would not be a panacea. It would still leave most of the Balkan problems up in the air.

MR. ST. JOHN: That is right.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Let us see what you mean by that. Do you mean that, because they are all agricultural countries, they are exporting the same kind of things and that they are competitive—and would be at each other's throats again for economic reasons?

MR. DRUCKER: That is one argument. Another one is that the real issues are much more profound than can be solved on that superficial level of legal constructions and constitutional amendments.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Such as the religious issue.

MR. DRUCKER: Such as the religious—or such as, for instance, the fact that they are all peasants and that that means something very definite to them.

MR. ST. JOHN: Another real issue, as I see it, is the issue of government.

MR. DRUCKER: I think that that is *the* real issue.

MR. ST. JOHN: That is, whether they shall have a strong centralized government in Belgrade or Bucharest, such as there has been in the past, or have what we call localism. The Chetniks and the Partisans seem to me to illustrate the struggle.

MR. DRUCKER: Those are the two Yugoslav guerrilla armies.

MR. ST. JOHN: The Chetniks are the centralists. They have

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barrels of crude petroleum (42-gallon barrel). In the same year the United States production was 1.4 billion barrels; Russian, 212 million barrels; Venezuelan, 185 million barrels; and Iranian, 78.5 million barrels.

been backed by little King Peter and the Royal Yugoslav Government-in-Exile. They represent a strong centralist government. If Mikhailovitch were alone there and succeeded, he would bring King Peter and the Royal Yugoslav government back, and there would be a strong central government.

The Partisans, on the other hand, who are in those territories which they have occupied along the Dalmatian Coast, have set up local units of self-government. The nearest thing you can compare them to are the little soviets in Russia, where they have local autonomy.

MR. DRUCKER: I agree with you, but I think you have to go one step further. It is true that the peasants want local autonomy. In the very small communities there is genuine local self-government, or something like the New England town meeting of a hundred years ago, everywhere. At the same time there must be a government. What has happened is that every group that established such local self-government at once turned into a centralist oppressor for the other groups.

Not so long ago the Serbs were the champions of local self-government. Then they got their state. Lo and behold, they began to oppress the Croats and the Slovenes.

You have to find a form of central government which allows a strong state—because you have to have it—and yet, at the same time, allows local self-government.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: At this point I am confused. We have thrown out Hitler as a ghost that really does not explain the Balkan situation. We have thrown out national boundaries, because we say we cannot solve the national boundaries—at least not on the approved nineteenth-century basis. We have thrown out land reform because we say this is a nation of peasants and that there are not any very large landowners. I thought that we had also thrown out confederation, but now you are coming along and saying that if we can get confederation on a different basis, perhaps it will work. Is that your point?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes, I am glad that you pointed out that confusion. Confederation is, I think, in one way, the only answer, because it is the one way to get the strong government. But it will work only if it is a confederation in which you have the maximum local autonomy, which is a very different thing from the kind of confederation such as, for example, Bismarck established in Germany in 1870 or the thirteen original states in this country.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Now let me try to clarify another issue. There is the issue of centralism versus localism. Those are the words you have been using. By "centralism" I suppose you mean big nations?

MR. DRUCKER: The nineteenth-century national nations.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Big nations dominating minority groups in other areas?

MR. ST. JOHN: Right.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: By "localism" you mean that each small community which is more or less coherent in religion and in language and in education, and so on, shall have a certain degree of autonomy. Do you gentlemen maintain that if you had localism on that basis—small units, more or less coherent, each more or less self-ruling within a larger unit—that confederation would work under that basis?

MR. ST. JOHN: Yes, that is part of the solution. For example, to illustrate what we mean, in Yugoslavia up until the attack of the Germans, there was a strong central government in Belgrade which was dominated by Serbs, who imposed their will upon the rest of Yugoslavia, which is composed of Bosnians and Dalmatians and Croats and all those other people.

MR. DRUCKER: When the Serbs were the majority?

MR. ST. JOHN: They were the majority, but they had 100 per cent control.

MR. DRUCKER: That is right.

MR. ST. JOHN: One of the fallacies of democracy is that if you have 51 per cent of the votes, you have 100 per cent control. Under the scheme that Drucker and I have been talking about, you would have Dalmatia with some local autonomy, you would have Croatia with some local autonomy, you would have Serbia with some local autonomy, but not with all dominated by one.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: All these, instead of making up a Yugoslav state, would make up a Balkan state, along with the Greeks. How do the Greeks feel about this?

MR. DRUCKER: Look here one moment. You see, if you take the nineteenth-century idea, one thing like language made a nation, and everybody who spoke the same language was a national. In the Balkans you have all kinds of different shaping lines. It is religion which is very important; it is language; it is very often nothing but tradition which divides Croats and Serbs; and it is, above all, the fact that the Croats belonged to Austria for a thousand years, and the Serbs to Turkey.

MR. ST. JOHN: Sometimes even the kind of folk-dancing they do.

MR. DRUCKER: Or the ruling system which developed along different lines.

MR. ST. JOHN: Or sometimes something so petty as what language they shall use to buy a postage stamp. That is very petty, but it is important.

MR. DRUCKER: Or what calendar they use. There were riots in Yugoslavia when the Yugoslavs tried to reform the calendar, because that seemed to a good many of the small groups to be tyranny. There was a tremendous emphasis, maybe an overemphasis, placed on the local, the neighborhood community, and its jealously guarded independence. But that can work in the modern world only if there is a very strong frame some place else. Otherwise, you just

THE BALKANS

A Land of Mountains and Valleys

DARKER REGIONS ARE MORE THAN 2,000 FEET ABOVE SEA-LEVEL

get atoms, and the conqueror comes in and establishes a rule of force.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I understand that there are religious and language and other difficulties there. Is there not also the danger, however, that up at the top, among the cities, among the professional politicians, there are going to be some people in Belgrade, for example, or the people in Athens, who are going to say, "We want a big territory; we want to dominate"? That is, in fact, where the greater Serbia movement comes from, doesn't it? That is, I mean the Mikhailovitch group again.

MR. DRUCKER: Or the greater Bulgaria, the greater Greeks, the greater Rumanians, the greater Hungary.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: All right. These people will look to Russia or to England for support, and probably get it, and we have the international situation again.

MR. ST. JOHN: So it gets right back to the fact that if the big powers refuse to back some of these politicians in their propaganda and in their attempt to grab territory from the other fellow, one of the evils is eliminated. That gets right back to our power politics again, does it not?

MR. DRUCKER: I would not blame the politicians so much. Politicians are the same on whatever side of the case they stand, but I would certainly say that if you do not lay down the law, if you do not have a joint great-power policy, which simply establishes a framework, you cannot have any peace in the Balkans. It is impossible to leave the determination of the framework to the Balkan peoples; that has to be imposed.

MR. ST. JOHN: Yes, and that gets it all back to London, Washington, and Moscow, doesn't it?

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It seems to me, then, that what we have been doing is emphasizing three points. We have talked about the Balkans as an invasion route, and we have come to the conclusion that it is an excellent route—at this particular moment possibly the

best way of invading Germany through the back door and possibly very much more effective than France and the other possible routes.

MR. DRUCKER: I think that we ought to say that this is probably the topic of the Moscow Conference.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: At the present moment it is probably under consideration in Moscow.

A second point that we have been discussing is the issue between Russia and the Western Powers over the question of the Balkans. There you gentlemen seem to be agreed that it is largely a question of power politics and that it is a question not so much of who will dominate in the Balkans as of who will *not* dominate, each group being opposed to the other.

MR. ST. JOHN: Right.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Thirdly, we have talked about the internal dispute inside the Balkans. We have come to the conclusion that there are many things that separate the Balkans—ideological, economic, and otherwise—and that the best way to solve those problems would be by granting a large degree of local autonomy, with a confederation of these local units. But the essential point there is that the great powers should agree and cooperate. Unless the Russians, the English, and the Americans act in cooperation in that area, the Balkans will remain the powder keg of Europe, as they were all during the nineteenth century. We cannot refuse to recognize that fact.

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More on This Topic

BING, EDWARD J., "The 'Deferred' Balkan War," *American Mercury*, October, 1942. *Reviews Balkan rivalries and indicates some alternative solutions.*

DEAN, VERA MICHELES, "European Agreements for Post-war Reconstruction," *Foreign Policy Reports*, March 15, 1942. *Gives the texts of the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav federation agreements.*

DEL VAYO, J. ALVAREZ, "Balkan Possibilities," *Nation*, October 2, 1943. *Discusses Allied relations with the Balkan center of resistance.*

DUPONT, PIERRE, "Powder Magazine of the Balkans," *Free World*, August, 1943. *Reports on the aims and the success of the Partisan and underground resistance.*

HALECKI, OSKAR, "East Central Europe in Postwar Organization," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July, 1943. *Urges a federation with full equality of membership for each of the twelve small nations in East Central Europe, which lie between the great powers in the West and the East.*

KAUFMANN, FRITZ, "Central Europe after the War," *Free World*, October, 1943. *Analyzes the significance of Russian opposition to political federations in Central and Eastern Europe.*

PRIBICHEVICH, STOYAN, "Allied Strategy in Yugoslavia," *Fortune*, September, 1943. *Reports on the political developments that have brought the British government to a conspicuous shift in its policy on Yugoslavian affairs.*

———, "Fratricide in Yugoslavia," *Fortune*, June, 1943. *Reports on the divergences between the Yugoslav Partisans and General Mikhailovich's Chetniks, their relative military efficiency, and the failure of the Axis armies to subdue Yugoslavia.*

RADITSA, BOGDAN, "Watch the Balkans!" *New Republic*, September 20, 1943. *Warns that the Balkan peoples may have to achieve their freedom through revolution.*

ST. JOHN, ROBERT, *From the Land of Silent People*. New York: Halcyon House, 1943. *Reports his experiences in the Balkans after Hitler's invasion of Yugoslavia and Greece.*

TODOROV, KOSTA, "Can the Balkans Be Unified?" *American Mercury*, September, 1943. *Says that the Balkan peoples desire to be united in a democratic federation.*

XYDIS, S. G., "Bulgaria—Axis Satellite," *Current History*, October, 1943. *Examines the failures of Bulgarian foreign policy and the problems of a post-war Balkan federation.*

What Do *You* Think?

1. What is the strategic importance of the Balkans? How have such advantages been exploited by the great powers for "petty, power politics"?

2. Compare and contrast the position of the Balkans in the present war with that which they had in World War I. What similarities and dissimilarities do you find? Discuss.

3. What characteristics of the Balkans have, in the past, caused disunity? Do you think unity will be found as the result of a common effort to overthrow German control?

4. Do you agree with the speakers that Russia, Britain, and the United States actually do not want control of the Balkans, but each really desires to keep control from falling into the power of the other? What is your opinion of the role Russia desires to play in the Balkan situation? Why has Russia expressed opposition to the creation of a federation of the Balkan states?

5. What are the cleavages between the United States, Britain, and Russia in regard to their separate policies toward the resisting groups in Yugoslavia? In what sense may Yugoslavia be said to be the pivot and a key to the problem of relationships among these three powers?

6. Should the Balkan policy of the United States foster revolution and social reform there? Would you favor the proposal that Turkey be allowed to take over the Balkans? What is the character of American interests in the Balkans?

7. In what sense are the Balkans a political microcosm of the European problem of peace? What should be the relations of the small nations in the post-war world? Should they be allowed to federate, or should a policy of world federation be urged for large and small powers alike?

8. In view of the special circumstances of race, religion, government, economic interests, politics, and the like which tend to divide the peoples of the Balkans, what type of post-war settlement do you think is possible? What are the alternatives that could be employed, in order that the Balkans will no longer be known as the "hot box" of Europe?

The People Say....

The following letters are representative of the views expressed by the ROUND TABLE *audience on "What Is Sovereignty?" broadcast October 17, 1943.*

*

Need To Maintain International Order

War takes away many of my sovereign rights as a United States citizen. I am, therefore, against anything that deprives me of my liberties, provided the liberties that I enjoy are not harmful to the common general welfare.

We maintain law and order within a nation by the use of education, fines, imprisonment, and death. Nations will have to do likewise or else try to live in a continual state of anarchy. It is high time that the human race developed sufficient intelligence to free itself from the slavery of war. If nations' contracts are to mean anything, they must be backed up by something more substantial than mere signatures. War is a contagious disease, and nations so afflicted should be completely isolated. —*A listener from Clarence, Iowa.*

*

Why Not Join Together?

The discussion about the sovereignty of the nations in their relation to one another can be answered by our experience that led to the introduction of law in the relation of individuals.

About a century ago when this continent settled its citizens in the newly opened western territories, it was customary for a man to carry his gun for his own protection and because he felt that he was a law unto himself. Later on, when these territories became states and under the sovereignty of the state imposed their law on the citizen, nobody had to carry a gun. Law and order were established. The same is true with states. Either they accept a law binding on nations, or they have to carry a gun, so to speak, or, that is, they will have to continue to arm and live in jeopardy of their security in spite of it.

I should think that our experience as individuals would suggest the advantage of living in a lawful and orderly world where states or peoples are subject to a code of law and bound to respect their neighbors just as much as individuals are bound to do that. In the exceptional case when the individual or the nation violate the law, then the law that organized society sets up must be brought down upon that person or nation.

Since the majority of nations, as well as citizens, may be expected to prefer an orderly world, police action is necessary. This would include supervision of raw materials, factories, and so on. Then, an offending member of the community of nations would know,

just as the individual does, that a crime against the others would have to be punished.

In unity is strength—so why not all join together?—*A listener from New York, New York.*

*

It Is Time To Work Together

I enjoyed the program about sovereignty, as I have certainly been confused and discouraged by the way it has been thrown in the faces of those who are trying to plan for a better world. It seems to me that now is the time for us all to be Americans—to all work out together our part in the world scene. It is time for us actually to take part in the planning, instead of part of the people trying to plan and the others merely saying, "No, we can't do that; we would lose our sovereignty." These same people do not come through with any better plans. . . . .—*A listener from Chicago, Illinois.*

*

Appropriate Topic

The topic of sovereignty is certainly appropriate at this time. This particular discussion certainly covered all phases of the subject. As a student of Bodin, I was delighted to hear such an excellent discussion of the origin of the term "sovereignty." Concerning the mention of the roots of this concept, it is certainly true that Bodin was attempting to bolster the central monarchial authority in the conflict between the feudal fiefs and the king. . . . .—*A listener from Rockport, Massachusetts.*

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1:30 P.M. EASTERN WAR TIME

City	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*	*City*	*Call Letters*	*Kilocycles*
Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Martinsville, Va.	WMVA	1450
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Bluefield, W.Va.	WHIS	1440	Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060
Boston, Mass.	WBZ	1030	Pittsburgh, Pa.	KDKA	1020
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Charleston, W.Va.	WGKV	1490	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cincinnati, Ohio	WLW	700	Reading, Pa.	WEEU	850
Clarksburg, W.Va.	WBLK	1400	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Mass.	WBZA	1030
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Syracuse, N.Y.	WSYR	570
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Greenwood, S.C.	WCRS	1450	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	740
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400	Williamsport, Pa.	WRAK	1400
Harrisburg, Pa.	WKBO	1230	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150
Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240	York, Pa.	WORK	1350

12:30 P.M. CENTRAL WAR TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	Madison, Wis.	WIBA	1310
Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230
Dallas, Texas	WFAA	820	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Mobile, Ala.	WALA	1410
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Montgomery, Ala.	WSFA	1440
Eau Claire, Wis.	WEAU	1070	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
El Paso, Texas	KSTM	1380	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WOWO	1190	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Hattiesburg, Miss.	WFOR	1400	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Hibbing, Minn.	WMFG	1240	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Houston, Texas	KPRC	950	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Indianapolis, Ind.	WIRE	1430	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
La Crosse, Wis.	WKBH	1410	Virginia, Minn.	WHLB	1400
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Wichita, Kan.	KANS	1240

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN WAR TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	770	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLU	1450
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Ariz.	KYUM	1240

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC WAR TIME

Bakersfield, Cal.	KERN	1410	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Diego, Cal.	KFSD	600
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

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Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Minneapolis, Minn.	WLB	770	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810

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

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

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OCTOBER 31, 1943

THE INFLATION CRISIS

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SUGGESTED READINGS

BYRNES, JAMES F., "Stabilizing Costs," *Vital Speeches*, September 1, 1943.

"Changes in Rationing System," *United States News*, October 22, 1943.

DARROCK, MICHAEL, "What Happened to Price Control?" *Harper's*, July, 1943.

STEWART, MAXWELL S., "The Maze of the Black Market," *Survey Graphic*, October, 1943.

WARNE, COLSTON E., "Mr. Consumer Takes a Beating," *Current History*, September, 1943.

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